Abstract. While selfish routing has been studied extensively, the problem of designing better coordination mechanisms for routing over time in general graphs has remained an open problem. In this paper, we focus on tree networks (single source multiple destinations) with the goal of minimizing (weighted) average sojourn time of jobs, and provide the first coordination mechanisms with provable price of anarchy for this problem. Interestingly, we achieve our price of anarchy results using simple and strongly local policies such as Shortest Job First and the Smith's Rule (also called HDF). In particular, for the case of unweighted jobs, we design a coordination mechanism with polylogarithmic price of anarchy. For weighted jobs, on the other hand, we show that price of anarchy is a function of the depth of the tree and accompany this result by a lower bound for the price of anarchy for the Smith Rule policy and other common strongly local scheduling policies. Our price of anarchy results also imply improved approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problem of routing over a tree. This problem is well motivated from applications of routing in supercomputers and data center networks where average sojourn time is an important metric.
Introduction
As a central topic in algorithmic game theory, selfish routing problems have been studied extensively in the context of congestion games [20, 26, 27] . Being a representative class of potential games, network congestion games have served as a foundation for proving price of anarchy results. However they lack an important aspect of real network routing which is the fact that routing happens over time, and any realistic model should take this into account. To address this issue, several new models have been proposed to capture the nature of realistic routing over time [10, 11, 21, 19, 24, 13, 12, 4] . Amongst these models, the concept of coordination mechanisms, first introduced in an influential paper by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Nanavati [10] , have been proposed to capture the queueing nature of routing. Coordination mechanisms model the decentralized nature of routing decisions made by machines and the selfish behavior of jobs: they do so by seeking local policies that achieve a good price of anarchy in the resulting equilibria in a corresponding game. While these subjects have attracted a great amount of research, the problem of designing better coordination mechanisms for routing over time has remained a wide open problem, and results have been developed only for very special classes of networks such as parallel edges (corresponding to a multi-processor scheduling problem [10, 17, 12, 4] ). In this paper, we focus on tree networks, and provide the first coordination mechanisms with provable price of anarchy.
The significance of our results are two-fold: other than providing approximately optimal coordination mechanisms, our price of anarchy results also imply improved approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problem of routing over a tree. This problem is well motivated from applications of routing in supercomputers and data centers where average sojourn time is an important QoS metric. Before elaborating the model, we describe the significance of the optimization problem over trees in various applications.
Applications of optimizing routing over a tree: In 1985, Leiserson discovered that a variant of tree topology called fat tree network is a universal network for efficient network connections [23] . In a typical fat tree topology, each tree edge has a capacity (or bandwidth or processing power) and the edges closer to the root node have higher capacities than those to the leaves. The fat tree topology quickly became the de facto standard for connecting processors within supercomputers. Recently, the efficiency of tree topologies is being rediscovered in the context of data center architectures as data center sizes grow exponentially with the explosion of the cloud-based services. A typical server farm in a data center consists of a set of web severs interconnected by a fat tree topology. See, for example, an important paper on this topic by Al-Fares, Loukissas and Vahdat [1] . Despite such important applications of optimal routing tasks over tree topologies, very little is known from a theoretical standpoint about scheduling jobs over a tree network to minimize their average sojourn time which is a fundamental quality of service metric for evaluating the performance of such a system. The sojourn time of a job is defined as the total time the job spends in the network. On the other hand, minimizing the makespan of a schedule, defined as the maximum sojourn time over all the jobs, has a vast literature in these settings [14, 25, 24] , including the celebrated result of Leighton, Maggs and Rao [22] .
The Model
We are given a tree T = (V, E) rooted at node r ∈ V . Each edge e ∈ E in the tree is a machine 4 with speed s(e). For the rest of the paper, we use the terms "edge" and "machine" interchangeably. There is a set of jobs J with unique identifiers, which will be used by our policies for breaking ties consistently. Each job j ∈ J has weight w j and length p j , and its processing time on edge e is p je = p j /s(e). Each edge can process at most one unit of the jobs during a unit time-step, and a job j requires p je time-units of processing on an edge e. At time t = 0, all the jobs are located at the root.
A job j can be served by only the nodes in the subset L j ⊆ V . This models, for example, the fact that some servers in a data center may not have the necessary content to satisfy a request. The job j starts at the root and wants to exit the tree through any Fig. 1 . In our model, each edge e has a speed s(e). Each job j starts at the root and needs to travel to one of the nodes in Lj, shown in dashed circles. To the right, we show how our model generalizes the related machines (top right) and the restricted assignment setting (bottom right).
one of the nodes in L j , which are called the destination-nodes of j. Accordingly, the job j selects a path i = (e 1 , . . . , e l ) that begins at the root of the tree and terminates at some node in L j . Here, e 1 is the first edge on the path (adjacent to the root), and e l is the last edge. The job can start getting processed on an edge e k , k ∈ {2, . . . , l}, only after it is processed completely by the preceding edge e k−1 . The job exits the tree when it gets completely processed on the last edge e l , and the time at which this event takes place is called the sojourn time of the job. The weighted sojourn time of j is equal to its weight w j times its sojourn time. Note that since all the jobs are at the root node at time t = 0, the average sojourn time is equivalent to the average flow-time in our context. A reader familiar with the scheduling literature can see that our model is a generalization of the related machine and the restricted assignment settings (see Figure 1 ).
The underlying optimization problem asks us to route every job j through a root-todestination path terminating in L j , and provide a scheduling policy on each edge so as to minimize the sum of their weighted sojourn times. We allow preemption of jobs on an edge. The jobs, however, are selfish agents who cannot be forced to obey the dictate of a centralized authority. Thus, in our model, the machines declare their scheduling policies in advance, and this induces a simultaneous-move game between the jobs. We require that the scheduling policies be strongly local, in the sense that the scheduling decision by an edge at any time-instant depends only on the current set of jobs waiting to be processed on that edge, and is independent of the global state of the system. In this game, the strategy of each job j consists of selecting a path from the root to any one of the destination-nodes in L j . The vector θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ |J| ) denotes an outcome (strategy-profile) of the game, where θ j is the path selected by the job j. The symbol (i, θ −j ) denotes an outcome where the job j selects the path i, and every job j = j selects the path θ j . The symbol Cost j (θ) denotes the cost incurred by the job j under the outcome θ, which is equal to its weighted sojourn time. An outcome θ is in a (pure) Nash equilibrium iff no job can reduce its cost by unilaterally deviating to another path, i.e., iff Cost j (θ) ≤ Cost j (i, θ −j ) for all jobs j and root-to-destination paths i terminating at a node in L j .
The price of anarchy (PoA) of the game is the worst (maximum) possible ratio between the total cost of the agents in a Nash equilibrium and the optimal objective of the underlying optimization problem. Intuitively, it is a measure of the degradation in the overall system-performance due to the strategic interactions between the jobs.
We want to solve the following problem: Find a set of scheduling policies for the machines so as to minimize the PoA of the resulting game.
Our Contributions and Techniques
We analyze the PoA of the game induced among the jobs when the machines follow a natural and easy to implement scheduling policy known as Smith's Rule [28] or "Highest Density First" (HDF). Under this policy, at every time-step a machine works on a job j that is available for processing and has maximum "density" w j /p j . When all jobs have the same weight, this reduces to the "Shortest Job First" (SJF) scheduling policy. If multiple jobs happen to have the same density, then all the machines use the same tie-breaking rule to decide which one of these jobs to consider first. Hence, without loss generality, we will assume throughout the rest of the paper that no two jobs have exactly the same density.
Unweighted Jobs. When the jobs are unweighted and the machines follow SJF policy, we prove that the PoA of the induced game is O(log 2 (s max /s min )) (Theorem 3). Here, s max (resp. s min ) denotes the speed of the fastest (resp. slowest) machine. Note that this implies constant PoA when all the machines are identical; even in the general case, the PoA is independent of the number of jobs or nodes in the network. Approximation Algorithms. It is known that Smith's Rule (HDF) induces a game with a pure NE [15] which can be computed in polynomial time by greedily adding jobs in the decreasing order of their densities. This implies that our PoA results also lead to approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problems (both for the weighted and unweighted jobs), the approximation ratio being the same as the PoA of the game.
Our Technique: Both of the PoA upper-bounds in this paper are obtained using the following simple technique: First, we find an LP relaxation for the underlying optimization problem and write down its dual. Next, we consider any arbitrary Nash equilibrium outcome θ, and based on this outcome assign values to the dual variables in such a way that satisfies all the dual constraints, thereby getting a feasible solution to the dual LP. Finally, we show that the objective of this feasible dual solution is at least 1/α times the total cost incurred by the jobs under θ. Weak duality implies that the PoA of the game is at most α. Our overall approach is inspired by papers [2, 6] . This technique is very powerful and can potentially be applied to bound the PoA in several other settings. Bilò et al. [7] give another application of this technique to analyze PoA.
Apart from the overall idea of using the dual fitting technique to analyze the PoA of the game, writing a linear programming relaxation with small integrality gap turns be a significant challenge for our problem. A direct extension of the time-indexed LP [2] has a huge integrality gap in our setting. We circumvent this difficulty for the case of unweighted jobs by first finding a set of critical edges which play a crucial role in how the jobs delay each other. Then, we write a time-indexed LP relaxation taking into account only these edges which brings the integrality gap down. See Section 2 for details.
Related Work. Following the landmark paper of Christodoulou et al. [10] who initiated the study of coordination mechanisms, several papers have been written on the topic for various problems. However, most of these results are for machine scheduling problems, either proving PoA results on the makespan objective function [17, 8, 4] or recently for the weighted completion times [12, 6] . In the context of selfish routing, the multimachine scheduling problem corresponds to a network of parallel edges and related machine scheduling is a special case of our model where the tree is a star, i.e, a tree of depth one (Figure 1 ). The only two results that go beyond the scheduling problem are by Hoefer et al [15] and by Christodoulou et al. [11] . The first paper only studies existence and computation of equilibria for various coordination mechanisms and leaves the PoA question as an open problem. The second paper discusses a quite different setting with non-atomic players.
Our work is also related to the literature on the PoA of selfish routing [20, 27] , and more specifically unsplittable selfish routing [26] . Here we extend the selfish routing model by incorporating a temporal component into the problem formulation. Other attempts to address this issue include [21, 19, 13, 24] , but none of these results discuss coordination mechanisms using strongly local (decentralized) policies.
We have recently learned through personal communication that scheduling over tree and line networks are also being considered in the online (and resource augmentation) setting in a recent (ongoing) work by Im et al. [16] and Antoniadis et al. [3] . Finally, our work is related to approximation algorithms of classical optimization problems for minimizing the weighted sum of completion times and flow times [18, 9, 2, 5] , none of which present an approximation algorithm for the problem minimizing average completion time in routing over a tree.
2 O(log 2 (s max /s min )) PoA for Unweighted jobs
In this section, we assume that all the jobs have unit weights, and bound the PoA of the game where every edge follows the Shortest Job First (SJF) scheduling policy (Theorem 3). We start with a high-level overview of our approach. We say that a job j is delayed by another job j on an edge e at time t iff two conditions are satisfied at the same time: (a) the job j is available for processing on edge e, and (b) instead of j, the edge is processing the job j . A machine following the SJF policy never sits idle when one or more jobs are waiting in its queue. This ensures that the sojourn time of a job j is exactly equal to the total amount of processing done on j by all the edges, plus the total delay it encounters due to all other jobs. The former quantity is given by e∈i p je , where i is the path selected by the job. It is the latter quantity for which it is difficult to get a closed-form expression. We overcome this difficulty by showing that there is a small subset of critical edges on any path (Definition 1), and that one job can delay another only on one of these edges. This line of reasoning culminates in a key structural result (Theorem 2) that gives an upper bound on the maximum delay a job j can experience due to any single job j = j.
As alluded in Section 1.2, we now confront the task of designing a suitable LP relaxation for the underlying optimization problem. A straightforward extension of the time-indexed LP considered in [2] to our setting leads to a large integrality gap. On the positive side, the time-indexed LP has one nice property: Its dual has variables that can be interpreted as decomposing the total delay incurred by a job across the edges on its path. The duals of other "natural" LP relaxations for our problem do not seem to be amenable to such a nice interpretation. Accordingly, we modify the time-indexed LP relaxation by only taking into account the critical edges of the tree. As the number of critical edges is small, this brings down the integrality gap of the LP. We then manage to fit its dual using Theorem 2.
To proceed with the technical details, let s max (resp. s min ) denote the speed of the fastest (resp. slowest) of a machine, and let K = log(s max /s min ) . For ease of exposition, we assume that the speeds of the machines are discretized in powers of two. By standard time stretching arguments, it is easy to show that this assumption can lead to at most a factor two loss in the PoA of our coordination mechanism. Assumption 1 For all e ∈ E, we have s(e) = 2 k · s min for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. Definition 1. Let e i,k denote the edge of minimum depth on path i that has speed 2 k s min . We refer to such an edge as a critical edge on that path. We define E i = ∪ k {e ik } to be the set of all critical edges on path i.
Below, we describe our LP relaxation for the underlying optimization problem. For rest of the paper, we overload the notation i ∈ L j to denote a path i that starts at the root and terminates at a node in L j . Minimize j i∈Lj e∈Ei t
j i∈Lj :e∈i x ijet ≤ 1 ∀ edges e, times t (4)
In an integral feasible solution of the above linear program, the variable x ij ∈ {0, 1} indicates if the job j takes the path i ∈ L j . The variable x ijet ∈ {0, 1} indicates if the job j takes the path i ∈ L j and is being processed on the edge e ∈ i at time-step t.
Constraint 2 states that every job has to take some path. Constraint 3 states that if a job j takes a path i ∈ L j , then it has to get completely processed on all the edges on this path. Finally, constraint 4 states that every edge can process at most one unit of the jobs during one time-step.
The second summation in the LP objective gives the total amount of processing done on all the jobs, which clearly is a lower bound on the sum of their sojourn-times. Now, fix any job j which takes a path i ∈ L j , and consider an edge e ∈ i on this path. The term t x ijet · (t/p je ) is known as the fractional completion time [2] of the job j on the edge e. This is at most the time at which the edge e finishes processing the job, which, in turn, is at most the sojourn-time of j. We sum this quantity over all the critical edges E i on path i, and the number of such critical edges is O(K). Thus, the summation i∈Lj e∈Ei t (t/p je ) · x ijet is O(K) times the sojourn-time of j. Summing over all the jobs, we see that the overall LP objective is O(K) times the objective of the underlying optimization problem.
We now get a new LP by replacing the 1 in the right hand side of constraint 4 with 1/(4K). This imposes the condition that a machine can process at most 1/(4K) units of the jobs during one time-step, and, by standard scaling arguments, it is easy to show that this increases the LP objective by a factor of 4K. The dual of this new LP is given by LP (6) . By weak duality, we get Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The objective of any feasible solution to LP (6) is O(K 2 ) times the optimal objective of the underlying optimization problem, where K = log(s max /s min ) .
For the rest of this section, we will assume that every edge follows SJF scheduling policy, and we will analyze the PoA of the resulting game. The theorem below bounds the maximum delay a job can encounter due to any other job.
Theorem 2. Suppose that every machine runs SJF scheduling policy. Consider any two jobs j * , j * 1 , and fix any outcome θ (not necessarily a Nash Equilibrium) of the induced game. Let e ∈ θ j * ∩θ j * 1 be an edge with slowest speed that is common to the paths taken by the jobs. Then the total delay of the job j * due to the job j * 1 is at most 2p j * /s(e). Proof (Sketch). Consider the path θ j * = (e 1 , . . . , e l ), where e 1 (resp. e l ) is the edge adjacent to (resp. farthest away from) the root. We decompose this path in w segments, for some natural number w, in the following manner. Consider a function f :
corresponds to the sequence of edges e f (k) , e f (k)+1 , . . . , e f (k+1)−1 . The decomposition satisfies two properties.
-The speeds of the first edges of these segments form a strictly decreasing sequence.
Hence, Assumption 1 implies that s(e f (1) ) > s(e f (2) )/2 > · · · > s(e f (w) )/2 w−1 . -Within each segment, the speed of the first edge is at most the speed of any other edge. Thus, s(e f (k) ) ≤ s(e) for all k ∈ [1, w] and e ∈ {e f (k) , . . . , e f (k+1)−1 }.
Note that the first edge e f (k) of every segment k ∈ [1, w] is a critical edge on the path θ j * . We show that the job j * can get delayed by other jobs only on this set of edges {e f (k) : k ∈ [1, w]}. Now, under SJF policy, the job j * can get delayed by another job j * 1 only if p j * 1 ≤ p j * , and, in this case, the delay experienced by j * due to j * (k) ). Thus, the total delay incurred by j * due to j * 1 is upper bounded by the sum 1 k=k * p j * /s(e f (k) ), where k * is the segment with the largest index whose first edge also belongs to θ j *
1
. This sum is part of a geometric series with common ratio 1/2, and is at most 2p j * /s(e e f (k * ) ). The theorem follows from the fact that the edge e f (k * ) has the slowest speed among all the edges that are common to the paths θ j * and θ j * 1 .
In Figure 2 , we give an algorithm that takes any Nash equilibrium of the game (under SJF policy), and, depending on this input, sets the variables in LP (6). Figure 2 , then for all jobs j and root-to-leaf paths i ∈ L j , we have Cost j (i, θ −j ) = e∈i u ije .
Lemma 2. If the dual variables are assigned values as in
Proof. Fix the outcome (i, θ −j ). Now, the sojourn-time of j equals the amount of time j is processed, plus the amount of time it is delayed due to the other jobs. The former quantity is equal to e∈i p je , the latter quantity being j =j δ ij (j ). Thus, we get:
INPUT: Any outcome θ of the game (under SJF policy) that is in a Nash equilibrium.
1. Set yj ← Costj(θ). 2. Consider an indicator variable λjet ∈ {0, 1} that is set to 1 iff (a) the path θj contains the edge e as a critical edge, i.e., e ∈ E θ j and (b) the sojourn-time of job j is at least t under the outcome θ. Set zet ← j 2 · λjet. 3. Set the variable uije as follows.
(a) If e = Ei, then uije ← pje.
(b) Else if e ∈ Ei, then let Γije denote the set of all jobs j = j such that e is the slowest edge in i ∩ θ j . Let δij(j ) be the total delay experienced by j due to the job j under the outcome (i, θ−j). Set uije ← pje + j ∈Γ ije δij(j ). To see why equation 11 holds, define J + to be the set of jobs which make positive contributions towards the sum j =j δ ij (j ), i.e., J + = {j = j : δ ij (j ) > 0}. Each job j ∈ J + has i ∩ θ j = ∅, and there is a unique critical edge on path i that is also the slowest edge in i ∩ θ j . So each job j ∈ J + is part of exactly one of the sets in {Γ ije : e ∈ E i }. In other words, {Γ ije : e ∈ E i } induces a partition of the jobs in J + . Figure 2 , then they satisfy the constraints 7 and 8 of LP (6).
Lemma 3. If the dual variables are assigned values as in
Proof. The right hand side of constraint 7, by Lemma 2, is equal to Cost j (i, θ −j ). The left hand side, by Figure 2 , is equal to Cost j (θ). The constraint is satisfied as the Nash equilibrium condition dictates that Cost j (θ) ≥ Cost j (i, θ −j ). In constraint 8, the edge e is not a critical edge on the path i. Hence, by Figure 2 , the quantity z et is zero at all times t. Furthermore, the quantity u ije is set to p je , so that the left hand side of the constraint is 1, which is equal to its right hand side.
Lemma 4. Fix any job j, any path i ∈ L j , any critical edge e ∈ E i , and any job j ∈ Γ ije . Let δ ij (j , t) be the total delay experienced by j due to the job j (anywhere in the tree) on or after time t, under the outcome (i, θ −j ). We have δ ij (j , t) ≤ 2λ j et ·p je .
Proof. The main difficulty in proving the lemma is that δ ij (j , t) refers to the outcome (i, θ −j ), whereas λ j et refers to the outcome θ. So we introduce the quantity λ * j et , which is the exact analogue of λ j et under the outcome (i, θ −j ). Note that the edge e already belongs to θ j and is a critical edge. Hence, we drop condition (a) used in defining λ j et in Figure 2 . We then consider two possible cases.
if the sojourn-time of j under (i, θ −j ) is at least t; 0 otherwise.
By our assumption in the first paragraph of Section 1.2, either p j < p j or p j > p j .
Case 1. Either λ * j et = 0 or p j < p j . Here, if λ * j et = 1, then the job j is already out of the system by time t under the outcome (i, θ −j ). Naturally, we have δ ij (j , t) = 0, and the lemma holds. On the other hand, if p j < p j , then SJF scheduling policy ensures that the job j never gets delayed by the job j , and we again have δ ij (j , t) = 0. Case 2. λ * j et = 1 and p j > p j . In this case, first note that by Theorem 2, δ ij (j , t) ≤ 2p je . Since λ * j et = 1, we get:
Since p j > p j , SJF scheduling policy ensures that the processing of j is not affected if j switches its path. Specifically, the time-steps at which j is processed by edge e remains unchanged under the two outcomes (i, θ −j ) and θ. Thus, we have λ j et = λ * j et , and equation 12 implies that the lemma holds. Lemma 5. If the dual variables are assigned values as in Figure 2 , then they satisfy all the constraints of LP (6).
Proof. By Lemma 3, the constraints 7, 8 are already satisfied. We focus on the remaining constraint 9. Fix any job j, any path i ∈ L j , and any edge e ∈ E i . By Lemma 4:
Under the outcome (i, θ −j ), the total delay experienced by j due to the jobs in Γ je till time-step t is, by definition, at most t. This leads to the following inequality.
From Figure 2 , equation 14 and equation 13 , we see that constraint 9 is satisfied.
Lemma 6. If the dual variables are set as in Figure 2 , then the objective of LP (6) is at least (1/2) · j Cost j (θ).
Proof. Fix the outcome θ, and focus on any job j with sojourn-time Cost j (θ).
(Case 1) t ≤ Cost j (θ). In this case, Figure 2 implies that the job j contributes 2 to each of the z et 's corresponding to the critical edges in the path θ j , and it makes zero contribution to the remaining z et 's. Since θ j has at most K critical edges, the total contribution of the job to the sum e z et is at most 2K.
(Case 2) t > Cost j (θ). Here, by Figure 2 , the job j contributes 0 to the sum e z et .
Summing over all time-steps, the contribution of any single job j to the sum e,t z et is at most 2K · Cost j (θ). Next, summing over the contributions from all the jobs, we infer that et z et ≤ (2K) · j Cost j (θ). Since y j = Cost j (θ) for all jobs j, we get: LP-objective = Theorem 3. If every machine follows Shortest Job First (SJF) policy and every job has unit weight, then the price of anarchy of the induced game is O(log 2 (s max /s min )), where s max (resp. s min ) is the maximum (resp. minimum) speed among all the machines.
Interestingly, we get super-constant upper bound on the PoA because the speeds of the edges may keep on decreasing as we traverse farther along a path starting from the root-node. This is precisely the situation in the real-world fat-tree networks. In contrast, consider an instance where the edges adjacent to the root-node have the slowest speeds. In this instance, the proof of Theorem 2 implies that a job can get delayed by other jobs only on the first edge on its path. Thus, we can write a new time-indexed LP where we take into account the fractional completion times of the jobs only on these edges at depth one. This LP will give a constant approximation to the underlying optimization problem, as a path starting from the root contains exactly one edge of depth one. We can then execute the same analysis as outlined in this section to get constant PoA.
O(d
2 ) PoA for Weighted Jobs
In this section we observe that when jobs can have arbitrarily different weights, the PoA of the game depends polynomially on the depth of the tree.
Theorem 4.
There is an instance of the problem where if every edge follows HDF scheduling policy, then the game induced between the jobs has PoA = Ω( √ d).
On the positive side, we can extend our dual-fitting framework to derive the following upper bound on the PoA. Theorem 5. If every machine follows HDF scheduling policy, then the PoA of the game induced between the jobs is at most 8d 2 , where d is the depth of the tree.
